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Abstract
The purpose of this study is to identify the characteristics of large cap companies that have
been sanctioned by the United States Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for
earnings management, and to test those characteristics on small cap companies to determine
whether they can be used to detect earnings management in the small cap space. Thirteen
non-accrual financial characteristics identified by previous researchers are tested, including
both financial ratios and account levels. Univariate and multivariate analysis are used in the
determination of the applicability of large company indicators of earnings management to
small cap companies.
I.
Introduction
The catalyst for the study is extant research that indicates that earnings management occurs
more often in small companies than in larger companies (Ajina et al., 2016, Hoang, 2007;
Beasley et al., 1999; Feroz et al., 1991; Persons, 1995; Kreutzfeldt and Wallace, 1986;
Kinney and McDaniel, 1989), yet there is little research on earnings management in small cap
companies. This study is intended to fill this gap, and thus should be of interest to a variety
of entities, including regulators, academics, and practitioners.
The next section presents background information on SEC sanctions. This is followed by a
review of the relevant literature. The subsequent sections discuss the sample, the
methodology, and results of the empirical tests. The final section presents the conclusions,
the limitations of the study, and suggestions for areas of future research.
II.

SEC Sanctions

The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) seeks various remedies and sanctions,
including equitable and administrative, for earnings management conduct in violation of the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Both individuals and
companies can be found liable for violations of the securities acts. The equitable remedy is an
injunction to prohibit future illegal conduct. Violation of such an injunction could result in
additional monetary penalties and imprisonment for contempt. In addition, the SEC may also
seek monetary penalties/fines, and disgorgement of illegal profits. Administrative remedies
and sanctions include cease and desist orders, orders for accountings and disgorgement of
illegal profits, restatements of earnings, prohibitions from serving as officers and directors,
and monetary penalties per the Acts (About the Division of Enforcement). The SEC also has
the discretion to enter into agreements that influence the severity of statutory sanctions,
including cooperation agreements, deferred prosecution agreements and non-prosecution
agreements. (SEC Enforcement Manual). It is also within the power of the SEC to consult
with, informally refer matters to, and work cooperatively with federal (Department of Justice)
and state enforcement authorities (in any parallel civil and criminal investigations), the Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB), federal banking agencies pursuant to the
Graham-Leach-Bliley Act, and state professional licensing and association boards (About the
Division of Enforcement).
III.
Identification of Financial Variables
The identification of the financial variables tested in this study is based upon a review of the
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relevant literature, which is the focus of this section. Previous research suggests that there
are several ways in which companies engaging in earnings management differ from
companies not engaging in earnings management. Many studies have found that companies
engaging in earnings management have higher levels of receivables, inventory and long-term
debt than companies not engaging in earnings management. For example, Dalnial et al.
(2014) study publicly listed firms in Malaysia and find that the total debt/total assets, total
debt/total equity, inventory/total assets, and receivables/sales ratios are statistically
significantly different for fraud and non-fraud companies. In addition, they find that these
ratios tend to be higher for firms with fraudulent financial statements. In their study of
companies in Lithuania, Kanapickiene and Grundiene (2015) report that the inventory/sales,
long-term debt/equity, long-term debt/total assets, receivables/sales, receivables/total assets,
and total liabilities/total assets ratios are significantly different. Kaminski et al. (2004) use a
matched sample of 79 companies to evaluate the usefulness of 21 financial ratios. They find
that in the years preceding what they term “the fraud year,” interest expense/total liabilities,
sales/accounts receivable, cost of goods sold/sales, and accounts receivable/total assets are
significantly dissimilar for the two types of companies. Persons (1995) studies the usefulness
of financial statement data as predictors of accounting fraud. She identifies companies’
involvements in fraudulent financial reporting via SEC data, and matches them with nonfraudulent companies. Using stepwise logistic models, she concludes that total
liabilities/total assets, receivables/total assets, and inventory/total assets tend to be higher for
sanctioned firms as opposed to non-sanctioned firms, and that these differences are
statistically significant. Using an Artificial Neural Network to assist in identifying a model
for uncovering fraud based on financial statements, Fanning and Cogger (1998) use a set of
102 pairs of companies, matching companies identified by the SEC as having committed
fraud with non-fraud companies. They conclude that the accounts receivable/sales,
inventory/sales, and long-term debt/shareholders’ equity are statistically significant (α = 0.01)
and tend to be elevated for sanctioned companies.
There are also several studies dealing with two of the variables. For example, Dichev et al.
(2013) identify large inventory build-ups, and increasing or high debt as red flags. In her
study of earnings manipulation in failing firms, Rosner (2003) reports that such firms have
significant increases in accounts receivable, inventory, and sales, and significant decreases in
operating cash flows. Beasley et al. (1999) find that companies committing financial
reporting fraud tend to do so by overstating revenues, accounts receivable, and inventory.
Moore (2007) tests combinations of significant variables in order to create a predictive
model. She finds that inventory/sales and accounts receivable are statistically significantly
higher in sanctioned companies as compared to non-sanctioned companies. Feroz et al.
(1991) report that most of the AAERs issued by the SEC involve receivables and inventory
overstatements. In research concerning earnings management, Roy chowdhury (2006)
reports that it is tied to the levels of inventory and receivables. The Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) Report Pursuant to Section 704 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (2003)
reports that in the expense recognition area, corporations overstate ending inventory and
accounts receivable. Summers and Sweeney (1998) utilize a sample of fifty-one firms that
committed fraud between 1981 and 1987 identified via the Wall Street Journal Index
(matched with firms that had not committed fraud). They report that the inventory/sales ratio
is statistically significant in the year preceding the fraud year and that it is higher for
sanctioned companies. In their research on detecting fraud, Lendez and Korevec (1999) find
that the overstatement of assets via reserve accounts for inventory and receivables is a
common method of earnings management.
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There is also research related to one of the three areas. For example, Beneish (1999) utilizes
a sample of 74 companies that were issued AAERs between 1987 and 1993 to identify
variables that detect earnings manipulation, and finds that the receivables/sales ratio is
statistically significant. Ricci and Gavin (2014) find inventory manipulating companies tend
to have higher inventory than non-inventory manipulating companies. In their study of firms
that have been sanctioned by the SEC, DeChow et al. (2011) conclude that firms
manipulating earnings have higher levels of external financing. Castro and Martinez (2009)
find that companies who engage in income smoothing tend to have higher long-term debt.
Moreira and Pope (2007) find that the likelihood of earnings management increases as debt
increases. In their study of earnings management prior to issuing bonds, Yixin et al. (2010)
report that firms engage in earnings management with the goal of decreasing their cost of
debt. Using logistic regression, Suyanto (2009) finds that the inventory/total assets ratio is
significantly different in fraudulent financial statements compared to non-fraudulent financial
statements. Concerns about levels of debt may also be seen in the research on earnings
management as it relates to violating debt covenants. For example, Hettihewa and Wright
(2010) report that in the earnings management arena, managers are likely to make decisions
that avoid defaulting on debt covenants. Jha (2013) finds that upward earnings management
occurs prior to debt covenant violations. Franz et al. (2013) find that firms that are close to
breaching debt covenants are more likely to engage in earnings management than firms that
are not.
Based on the literature review, thirteen variables were identified. Each category of variable those relating to inventory, receivables, or debt - includes several measurements, as follows:
Accounts Receivable:
Gross Receivablesi
Receivables/Sales
Receivables/Total Assets
Inventory:
Inventory
Inventory/Sales
Inventory/Total Assets
Debt:
Long-term debt
Long-term debt/common equity
Long-term debt/total assets
Total liabilities
Total liabilities/total assets
Overall:
Sales
Total assets
IV.
Sample
The sample consists of thirty-one small cap companies that had been sanctioned by the SEC
matched by market cap in the year preceding the beginning of the earnings management as
stated by the SEC, and GIC Economic Sector. Three years of data were available for each
company for total of 186 firm-years. The sanctioned companies and their matches may be
seen in Appendix A
V.
Descriptives
The sample classified by GIC Economic Sector may be seen in Table 1. GIC Sectors 55

216

International Research Journal of Applied Finance

ISSN 2229 – 6891

Vol. VIII Issue – 4 April, 2017

www.irjaf.com

Utilities and 50 Telecommunication Services were not represented in the sample. In addition,
GIC 40 Financials was excluded from the sample because companies in this sector do not
have all of the variables necessary for inclusion in the study. While a larger sample would be
ideal, the universe of small cap companies identified as engaging in earnings management
and sanctioned by the SEC for earnings management is relatively small. Certainly, one
expects that there are companies that have been engaging in earnings management that have
not been identified, as well as companies engaging in earnings management who are still at
the investigation level and thus unidentified for researchers.
As indicated, the sample is weighted with companies in the Industrials (GIC 20), Information
Technology (GIC 45), Healthcare (GIC 35), and Consumer Discretionary (GIC 25) sectors.
This mirrors, to some extent, the distribution of the Russell Microcap Index, which is heavily
weighted with companies in the Financial Services, Health Care, Technology, and Consumer
Discretionary sectors. These sector clusters are also comparable to Beasley et al. (1999),
who found that sanctioned companies tend to be in the computer hardware and software,
other manufacturing, and health care industries. The presence of companies in the IT and
Consumer sectors are similar to that of the Deloitte Forensic Center (2009), which reported
both to be prominent sectors in terms of earnings management. However, Deloitte also found
a high number of telecommunications companies (Deloitte Forensic Center, 2009), as did
DeChow et al. (2011), while in the current study, Telecommunications Services (GIC 50) is
not represented.
Table 2 presents the number of cases on a calendar basis. 32.3 per cent of the sample began
the sanctioned behavior between 2006 and 2008. This is followed by 22.6 per cent of the
sample in between 2009 and 2011. Over half of the cases occurred between 2006 and 2011.
Table 3 contains the descriptives (means, medians, and standard deviations) of each type of
company.
Companies engaging in earnings management have higher average
receivables/sales, inventory/total assets, long-term debt/total assets, and total liabilities/total
assets than non-earnings management companies. Moreover, such companies have higher
median inventory and long-term debt.
VI.

Results

This section contains the results of the analysis. First, paired sample t-tests are used to
identify significant differences. Tests are run on the entire sample, the sample classified by
GIC Economic Sectors, and annually for the three years prior to the year in which the SEC
reports that the earnings management began (Years -1, -2 and -3).
VI.1 Paired Sample T-Tests
The first analysis examines the variables’ differences by using the matched sample and the ttest. Table 4 contains the results of the t-tests on the entire sample. As indicated, seven of
thirteen variables are statistically significant: three debt-related, one receivables-related, one
inventory-related, sales, and total assets. The significance of three of five of the debt ratios
suggests that debt may play a role in earnings management.
Table 5 contains the paired sample t-tests results by GIC Economic Sector. The differences
among sectors are striking. For example, in GIC 25 Consumer Discretionary, twelve of
thirteen variables are statistically significant, while in GIC 20 Industrials, only two are
significant. In GIC 25, the only variable that is not significant is inventory/sales. In GIC 35
Health Care, three variables are not significant, one receivables related, one inventory related
and one debt related. These results are similar to those of Beasley et al. (1999). The only
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variable that is significant across all sectors is receivables; the only variable that is not
significant in any sector is inventory/sales. These results suggest that detecting earnings
management may be more effective when done on a sectoral basis, rather than using a “one
size fits all” detection method.
Table 6 shows the variables’ ability to predict earnings management in one, two, and three
years (Years -1, -2, and -3, respectively) prior to the year the SEC reports that the earnings
management began. Seven of thirteen variables are statistically significant in Year -3,
including all of the debt-related ratios and account levels. Total assets and total liabilities
were significant in Years -2 and -3. None of the inventory variables was statistically
significant, and only one receivables-related ratio was significant in Year -2. None of the
variables are statistically significant in Year -1.
The fact that statistically significant differences were detected in Year -3, but for most of the
variables, not in Years -1 and -2 is confounding. Nevertheless, the results for the debt-related
variables support much of the previous research. One interesting result was that the
inventory/sales ratio is not statistically significant in the overall tests, the tests by GIC sector
or the tests by the years preceding the earnings management. This is in contrast to the
research completed by Fanning and Cogger (1998), Moore (2007), and Summers and
Sweeney (1998). Also of interest is that the inventory/total assets and receivables/total assets
ratios are significant in only two of the tests. While the receivables-related results may be
suspect due to the use of gross receivables and not net, the inventory results may be due to
the fact that some of the inventory manipulation is via the cost of sales which does not appear
directly in this study.
VI.2 Discriminant Analysis
The large number of independent variables warrants multivariate analysis, and accordingly,
discriminant analysis was conducted using earnings management as the criterion variable.
The predictor variables are the independent variables used in the univariate analysis. The
discriminant analysis is completed using principal component analysis with varimax rotation.
The analysis is conducted on overall sample, the sample by GIC Economic Sector, and by the
years preceding the earnings management (Years -1 to -3), and the results are presented in
this manner.
VI.3 Total Sample
The overall Wilks’ lambda is significant (p = 0.0056), indicating that discriminant analysis is
merited. The canonical correlation was 0.49. The standardized canonical discriminant
function coefficients may be seen in Table 7. The variables with the largest coefficients are
total assets, inventory/sales, receivables/sales, and inventory. The classification table for this
function, seen in Table 8, shows that 69.3 per cent of the companies were classified correctly,
and that this drops to 64.0 per cent in the cross-validation.
VI.4 Sample by GIC Economic Sector
Discriminant analysis was also done by GIC Economic Sector for the categories with the
highest number of firm-years, including GIC 20 Industrials (48 firm-years), GIC 45
Information Technology (42 firm-years), GIC 35 Healthcare (34 firm-years), and GIC 25
Consumer Discretionary (34 firm-years). Table 9 contains the Wilks Lambdas and levels of
significance for the sample categorized by GIC Economic Sector. As indicated, all are
statistically significant, and discriminant analysis was undertaken. Table 10 contains the
standardized canonical correlation coefficients used to create the respective discriminant
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functions for the GIC Economic Sectors. The variables excluded, indicated by EXC in the
table, failed the tolerance tests. Table 11 contains the classification results of the
discriminant analysis by GIC Economic Sector. Again, the results vary by sector. The
percentage of cases classified correctly in GICs 20 and 25 were 92.3 per cent and 100 per
cent, respectively. The cross-validation results were the same. In GIC 35 Health Care, the
percentage correct is 86.7, which drops to 60.0 per cent in the cross-validation. The
percentage classified correctly in GIC 45 Information Technology is 79.2 per cent, which
drops to 75 per cent in the cross-validation.
The next step was to examine the impacts of dividing the sample by Year (Year -1, Year -2,
and Year -3). Table 12 shows the Wilks’ Lambdas and significance for each year in the three
years preceding the earnings management. As indicated, none of the results were statistically
significant. Consequently, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected, and thus there is no basis
for additional analysis.
VII.

Conclusions and Suggestions for Future Research

The research question posed at the beginning of this study is: can the variables used to
identify earnings management in large cap companies be used for the same purpose for small
cap companies? The overwhelming conclusion of this study is that the “one size fits all”
approach to detecting earnings management is not appropriate. Both the univariate and
multivariate analyses indicate that the detection of earnings management on a sector by sector
basis is necessary.
These results provide several areas for future research. For example, twelve of thirteen
variables show statistically significant differences between the two types of companies in the
Consumer Discretionary sector (GIC 25), yet in the Industrials sector (GIC 20), only two of
thirteen variables are statistically significant. Clearly, additional research must identify the
variables that can be used to detect earnings management in the Industrials sector. In
addition, only six of thirteen variables in the Information Technology sector were statistically
significant, which provides an additional area for future research.
Future research may also investigate the reasons for the results concerning the three years
preceding the start of the earnings management. Why would there be no statistically
significant differences in the year directly preceding the one in which the SEC says the
sanctioned behaviour began, and a large number of differences three years prior to the year in
which the sanctioned behaviour began?
Regarding limitations to this study, the major one is the sample size. Unfortunately, the
number of small cap companies that have been sanctioned by the SEC for earnings
management is small, and there is no action that can be taken to increase the sample size
other than the reporting of SEC sanctions. While this is of concern, it does not obviate the
need for additional research concerning earnings management in small-cap companies.
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Appendix A. Sample Companies
Sanctioned Company

Matching Company

Apogee Technology Inc

Span-America Medical Sys Inc

Black Box Corp

Superconductor Technologies

Canadian Solar Inc

Calamp Corp

China Valves Technology Inc

Northwest Pipe Co

Comverse Technology Inc

Ati Technologies Inc

DGSE Companies Inc

Jaclyn Inc

DGSE Companies Inc

Ttc Technology Corp

Diamond Foods Inc

Coca-Cola Bottling

Eco2 Plastics Inc

Web Press Corp

Fuqi International Inc

Finishmaster Inc

Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Corp

Hawaiian Holdings Inc

Hain Celestial Group Inc

Worthington Foods Inc

Hansen Medical Inc

Align Technology Inc

Huron Consulting Group Inc

Forward Air Corp

JDA Software Group Inc

Triquint Semiconductor Inc

LSB Industries Inc

Synalloy Corp

Medquist Inc

Allegiant Physician Services

Merge Healthcare Inc

Millennium Healthcare Inc

Miller Energy Resources Inc

Stratic Energy Corp

Ocata Therapeutics Inc

Taro Pharmaceutical Industries

Saba Software Inc

Ceragon Networks Ltd

Stein Mart Inc

Dillards Inc

Symbol Technologies

Mentor Graphics Corp

Symmetry Medical Inc

US Oncology Inc

Terex Corp

Layne Christensen Co

United Industrial Corp

Spar Aerospace Ltd

Universal Travel Group

Silverleaf Resorts Inc

Verifone Systems Inc

Wyndstorm Corp

Volt Info Sciences Inc

G&K Services Inc

West Marine Inc

Friedmans Inc
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Table 1. Sample Distribution by GIC Economic Sector
GIC

Frequency

Percent

10 Energy

1

3.2%

15 Materials

1

3.2%

20 Industrials

8

25.8%

25 Consumer Discretionary

6

19.4%

30 Consumer Staples

2

6.5%

35 Health Care

6

19.4%

45 Information Technology

7

22.6%

Table 2. Sample Distribution by Year
Period

Frequency

Percent

1997 - 1999

5

16.1%

2000 - 2002

5

16.1%

2003 - 2005

3

12.9%

2006 - 2008

10

32.3%

2009 - 2011

6

22.6%

Table 3. Descriptive by Type
Type 1: Sanctioned Firms

Type 2: Matching Firms

Mean

Median

Std. Dev.

Mean

Median

Std. Dev.

Receivables

75.32

31.84

98.46

87.53

38.44

115.01

Receivables/sales

0.41

0.19

2.13

0.24

0.16

0.27

Receivables/total assets

0.19

0.18

0.14

0.22

0.18

0.16

Inventory

73.00

26.94

116.25

124.51

18.28

283.80

Inventory/sales

0.16

0.12

0.37

0.18

0.14

0.29

Inventory/total assets

0.16

0.11

0.18

0.14

0.12

0.12

Long-term debt

101.99

10.72

173.88

175.86

3.88

256.76

Long-term debt/common equity

0.37

0.04

1.95

1.16

0.12

2.72

Long-term debt/total assets

0.18

0.08

0.23

0.16

0.11

0.20

Total liabilities

213.01

75.01

282.20

407.29

85.74

569.46

Total liabilities/total assets

0.83

0.46

1.90

0.58

0.48

0.57

Sales

449.84

215.82

494.20

803.93

236.82

1,398.82

Total assets

371.24

194.85

369.94

680.43

250.92

998.17

RECEIVABLES

INVENTORY

DEBT

OTHER
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Table 4. Paired Sample t-Test Results, Overall Sample
t

Sig

Receivables

-1.09

(0.1383)

Receivables/sales

0.763

(0.2238)

Receivables/total assets

-1.468

(0.0728)*

Inventory

-1.330

(0.0929)*

Inventory/sales

-0.787

(0.2168)

Inventory/total assets

1.036

(0.1515)

Long-term debt

-1.66

(0.0502)*

Long-term debt/common equity

-1.72

(0.0442)*

Long-term debt/total assets

0.548

(0.2926)

Total liabilities

-2.47

(0.0077)**

Total liabilities/total assets

1.239

(0.1093)

Sales

-2.07

(0.0206)*

Total assets

-2.38

(0.0098)**

RECEIVABLES

INVENTORY

DEBT

OTHER

*** significant at 0.001 ** significant at 0.01 * significant at 0.10
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Table 5. Paired Sample t-test Results by GIC Economic Sector.
20
Industrials

25
Consumer
Discretionary

35
Health Care

45
Information
Technology

t

sig

t

sig

t

sig

t

sig

Receivables

1.76

(0.0455)* -3.32

(0.0020)***

-2.28

(0.0177)*

3.12

(0.0027)**

Receivables/sales

0.99

(0.1674)

-2.77

(0.0066)**

1.49

(0.0779)*

1.33

(0.0991)*

Receivables/total assets

1.20

(0.1215)

-3.74

(0.0008)***

-0.97

(0.1732)

0.22

(0.4158)

Inventory

1.03

(0.1562)

-2.14

(0.0237)*

-1.71

(0.0526)*

1.27

(0.1094)

Inventory/sales

0.13

(0.4503)

-0.70

(0.2460)

-0.13

(0.4499)

-0.78

(0.2231)

Inventory/total assets

0.14

(0.4469)

2.44

(0.0129)*

-1.44

(0.0858)*

-0.63

(0.2684)

0.87

(0.1961)

-2.93

(0.0047)**

-1.42

(0.0871)*

3.09

(0.0029)**

RECEIVABLES

INVENTORY

DEBT
Long-term debt
Long-term debt/common
equity
Long-term debt/total assets

1.30

(0.1025)

-1.98

(0.0322)*

-1.41

(0.0883)*

-0.13

(0.4489)

1.58

(0.0637)* -1.41

(0.0885)*

0.38

(0.3540)

1.20

(0.1214)

Total liabilities

0.39

(0.3514)

-3.11

(0.0032)***

-2.15

(0.0231)*

3.94

(0.0004)***

Total liabilities/total assets

0.24

(0.4045)

-3.99

(0.0005)***

1.51

(0.0758)*

0.57

(0.2861)

Sales

0.60

(0.2785)

-2.16

(0.0226)*

-2.40

(0.0140)*

2.14

(0.0226)*

Total assets

0.23

(0.4112)

-2.49

(0.0118)*

-2.53

(0.0108)*

3.54

(0.0010)***

OTHER

*** significant at 0.001

** significant at 0.01

* significant at 0.10
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Table 6. Paired Sample t-test Results by Year.
Year -1

Year -2

Year -3

t

(sig)

t

(sig)

t

(sig)

Receivables

-0.35

(0.3634)

-0.65

(0.2588)

-0.93

(0.1809)

Receivables/sales

0.92

(0.1832)

-1.63

(0.0572)*

0.06

(0.4762)

Receivables/total assets

-0.66

(0.2587)

-1.29

(0.1031)

-0.63

(0.2662)

Inventory

-0.44

(0.3333)

-0.75

(0.2301)

-1.17

(0.1259)

Inventory/sales

-0.10

(0.4623)

-0.77

(0.2252)

-0.73

(0.2354)

Inventory/total assets

0.27

(0.3935)

0.95

(0.1748)

0.61

(0.2730)

Long-term debt

-0.53

(0.2988)

-0.99

(0.1658)

-1.54

(0.0667)*

Long-term debt/common equity

-0.81

(0.2128)

-0.71

(0.2403)

-1.41

(0.0838)*

Long-term debt/total assets

-0.57

(0.2865)

-0.16

(0.4380)

1.33

(0.0964)*

Total liabilities

-1.05

(0.1499)

-1.48

(0.0740)*

-1.84

(0.0379)*

Total liabilities/total assets

-1.13

(0.1333)

0.83

(0.2076)

1.41

(0.0847)*

Sales

-0.88

(0.1921)

-1.21

(0.1176)

-1.51

(0.0711)*

Total assets

-0.83

(0.2076)

-1.47

(0.0766)*

-1.86

(0.0362)*

RECEIVABLES

INVENTORY

DEBT

OTHER

*** significant at 0.001

** significant at 0.01

* significant at 0.10
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Table 7. Std. Canonical Coefficients, Total Sample.
Function 1
RECEIVABLES
Receivables

-0.97

Receivables/sales

-1.80

Receivables/total assets

1.12

INVENTORY
Inventory

-1.70

Inventory/sales

2.15

Inventory/total assets

-0.13

DEBT
Long-term debt

-1.46

Long-term debt/common equity

0.39

Long-term debt/total assets

0.30

Total liabilities

1.75

Total liabilities/total assets

-0.67

OTHER
Sales

-1.22

Total assets

3.19

Table 8. Discriminant Analysis, Overall Sample.
Predicted Group Membership
Type
Original
Cross-validated

1

2

Total

1

42 (75.0%)

14 (25.0%)

56

2

21 (36.2%)

37 (63.8%)

58

1

38 (67.9%)

18 (32.1%)

56

2

26 (44.8%)

32 (55.2%)

58

Table 9. Wilks’ Lambda and Significance by GIC.
GIC

Wilks' Lambda

Chi-square

df

Sig.

20 Industrials

1

0.15

37.965

12

(.0002)

25 Consumer Discretionary

1

0.11

41.504

10

(.0000)

35 Healthcare

1

0.02

24.255

13

(.0289)

45 Information Technology

1

0.23

22.875

13

(.0432)
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Table 10. Standardized Canonical Discriminant Function Coefficients by GIC
20
Industrials

25
Consumer
Discretionary

35
Health Care

45
Information
Technology

Receivables

0.175

-0.404

-0.135

0.611

Receivables/sales

0.331

-1.345

-0.769

1.233

Receivables/total assets

-1.215

1.022

1.222

-2.098

Inventory

-0.358

5.197

3.751

-1.306

Inventory/sales

EXC

EXC

1.628

-0.991

Inventory/total assets

1.335

1.064

-0.754

2.220

Long-term debt

-1.912

-4.222

0.617

-3.430

Long-term debt/common equity

1.494

0.222

-2.753

0.663

Long-term debt/total assets

-4.420

2.156

-1.090

8.014

Total liabilities

EXC

EXC

8.104

2.502

Total liabilities/total assets

2.281

-0.546

0.671

-5.951

Sales

-2.478

-1.253

5.523

1.821

Total assets

7.355

EXC

-7.017

-0.575

RECEIVABLES

INVENTORY

DEBT

OTHER

Table 11. Discriminant Analysis by GIC Economic Sector.
GIC 20 Industrials
Predicted Group Membership
Type
Original
Cross-validated

1

2

Total

1

12 (92.3%)

1 (7.7%)

13

2

0 (0.0%)

15 (100.0%)

15

1

12 (92.3%)

1 (7.7%)

13

2

0 (0.0%)

15 (100.0%)

15

GIC 25 Consumer Discretionary
Predicted Group Membership
Type
Original
Cross-validated

1

2

Total

1

9 (100.0%)

0 (0.0%)

9

2

0 (0.0%)

17 (100.0%)

17

1

9 (100.0%)

0 (0.0%)

9

2

0 (0.0%)

17 (100.0%)

17

GIC 35 Health Care
Predicted Group Membership
Type

1

2

Total
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Original
Cross-validated

1

8 (88.9%)

1 (11.1%)

9

2

1 (16.7%)

5 (83.3%)

6

1

5 (55.6%)

4 (44.4%)

9

2

2 (33.3%)

4 (66.7%)

6

GIC 45 Information Technology
Predicted Group Membership
Type
Original
Cross-validated

1

2

Total

1

13 (92.9%)

1 (7.1%)

14

2

4 (40.0%)

6 (60.0%)

10

1

12 (85.7%)

2 (14.3%)

14

2

4 (40.0%)

6 (60.0%)

10

Table 12. Wilks' Lambda and Significance by Year
Wilks' Lambda

Chi-square

df

Sig.

Year -1

1

0.879

4.462

7

(0.7252)

Year -2

1

0.808

6.943

7

(0.4349)

Year -3

1

0.753

8.644

7

(0.2792)

i

Many small-cap companies do not report their allowances for doubtful accounts. Consequently, the authors
used gross receivables rather than net receivables in this study.
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